Two distinct approaches to meaning-experimental lab-based research on meaning and its maintenance in response to situational cues and observational field research on meaning-focused coping following highly stressful or traumatic situations-have both produced important insights into the mechanics underlying responses to meaning-relevant threats. It has been suggested that although these 2 approaches focus on different, specific aspects of meaning, they converge on common underlying phenomena. The present article considers how lab-based and field-based approaches align and diverge on their answers to 4 questions: (1) How is meaning defined in the context of meaning violation and restoration? (2) What are threats to meaning? (3) How do people respond to these threats? and (4) Why does meaning restoration matter? Our comparison of these lab-and field-based approaches suggests that they share considerable commonalities in conceptualization, but they diverge in important ways in terms of emphasis and empirical considerations. We conclude that lab-and field-based approaches to meaning violation and restoration may be focusing on the same phenomena studied at different levels, but with some qualitative differences, and we offer suggestions for how lab-and field-based approaches can better inform one another. Considering these two approaches conjointly provides a more holistic and comprehensive understanding of the fundamental phenomena of meaning threat and restoration.
Meaning systems comprise both the complex net of general or global beliefs regarding the world and oneself in the world (including one's worth, identity, and relationships) and networks of goals, ranging from the abstract to the very immediate and concrete. These global meaning systems have been referred to elsewhere as "meaning frameworks, or networks of expected associations . . . which allow people to understand their experiences and act with purpose in their environment" (Jonas et al., 2014, p. 225) or worldviews (Koltko-Rivera, 2004) or motivation action perception schemas (Peterson, 2013) . In the meaning literature, global beliefs have received the lion's share of attention relative to goals (Park, 2010) . Global beliefs refer to "a set of assumptions about physical and social reality" (Koltko-Rivera, 2004, p. 3) . Goal systems, networks of hierarchically ordered priorities that direct individuals' behavior across varied circumstances (Roberts & Robins, 2000) , are also important aspects of meaning systems, forming the backbone of a person's motivation in life. These goal hierarchies may be explicit or implicit; in particular, people may not be especially aware of the importance of maintaining what they already have (e.g., their health) until it is threatened or lost (Klinger, 2012) .
Meaning systems are central to psychological functioning (Park, Edmondson, & Hale-Smith, 2013) . Together, global beliefs and goals serve as a general orienting system (Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Park, Currier, Harris, & Slattery, 2017) . As is described below, a number of theoretical and empirical perspectives assert that maintaining harmony between global meaning and current experience is a high-order motive. Furthermore, meaning systems are the basis on which people assess their subjective sense of meaning in life, often assessed in research as a general judgment of the extent to which one's life is "meaningful" (George & Park, 2016a) . Meaning in life research suggests that a subjective sense of meaning in life comprises three dimensions: comprehension, characterized by a sense of coherence and understanding regarding one's life; purpose, involving experiencing life as being directed and motivated by valued life goals; and mattering, characterized by experiencing one's life as significant and of value in the world (George & Park, 2016a , 2016b Martela & Steger, 2016) . Life is experienced as meaningful to the extent that the world is perceived as comprehensible, one is successfully pursuing one's goals, and one's life matters in the ultimate scheme of things (King, Hicks, Krull, & Del Gaiso, 2006) , and these evaluations are largely based on the extent to which one's current experiences are congruent with one's global meaning system (e.g., global understanding of the world vis-à-vis one's current experience provides a sense of comprehensibility; George & Park, 2016a; Heintzelman & King, 2014) .
In the past few decades, research on meaning has proliferated, particularly in how people respond to meaning threats. Some studies explicitly focus on meaning (e.g., meaning maintenance model: Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006 ; feelings as information : Heintzelman, Trent, & King, 2013) , while others focus more generally on some variant of threat compensation (Proulx, 2012; Tritt, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012) . This latter umbrella classification could be broadened to include terror management theory (TMT; Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2015) and reactive approach-motivation (RAM; McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills, 2010) , along with others that are conceptually relevant to meaning threats and restoration. A very different approach to understanding responses to meaning threats comes from clinical and field researchers, who have developed a thriving body of primarily observational research focusing on coping with and recovery from high-magnitude threats to one's existence such as serious illness, bereavement, and trauma. It has been suggested that these two approaches describe the same phenomena, just at different levels (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012) , but to date, conceptual and empirical work from the two approaches has not been systematically compared or integrated.
Thus, two distinct lines of research exist, each developed to account for humans' propensity to maintain meaning in the face of challenges to their meaning systems, but they have developed relatively independently. Furthermore, these two approaches have tended to ask very different questions and focus on very different parts of the processes of meaning threat perception and recovery. At this point, we do not know the extent to which lab-and field-based studies refer to the same processes or to different ones. Thus, in this article, we aim to consider the ways in which lab-based work and field studies of major life stressors align, diverge, or complement one another in four basic areas, and to describe ways in which the two lines of work might usefully inform one another to advance our understanding of meaning.
In the following sections, lab-based approaches to meaning violation and recovery and field-based approaches to meaning violation and recovery are each briefly reviewed in turn. Then we compare how these two approaches align and diverge on their answers to four questions: (1) How is meaning defined in the context of meaning violation and restoration? (2) What are threats to meaning? (3) How do people respond to these threats? and (4) Why does meaning restoration matter? As a way of organizing our analysis, we draw on the meaning making model (Park & Folkman, 1997; Park, 2010) , a descriptive framework of meaning discrepancy and recovery that can accommodate both lab-and field-based approaches.
Laboratory-Based Approaches to Meaning Violation and Restoration
Multiple lab-based threat compensation perspectives have been developed. These perspectives differ in the focus of the threat (e.g., to one's continued existence, to one's certainty, to the comprehensibility of the world) but share the underlying notion that something is experienced-at some level, conscious or not-as discrepant with what one expects or desires (i.e., one's global beliefs or goals). This discrepancy produces a basic motivation to reduce the threat as measured by some lab-based behavior (e.g., endorsement of a cultural belief or increased goal motivation; see excellent discussions of these commonalities by Jonas et al., 2014; Randles et al., 2015) .
Lab-based studies from these perspectives have induced various meaning-related threats through experimental tasks. While sometimes, but not always, using "meaning" language, these approaches all focus on threats to some specific aspect of a meaning system, including TMT (mortality is considered to be the fundamental threat to one's existence; Jonas et al., 2014) , Control compensation (control beliefs are central in most people's meaning systems; Landau, Kay, & Whitson, 2015) , RAM (goals are central to one's purpose; McGregor et al., 2010) , and meaning as information (Heintzelman et al., 2013) and MMM , the latter two of which are both based on the notion that maintaining coherence or comprehensibility of the world is a central motive.
Although these lab-based approaches are distinct in their particulars, especially in the importance placed on one or another element of meaning and the specific compensations people make when meaning is threatened, they may have important underlying commonalities based on the role played by discrepancy in generating motivation to compensate for meaning threats (see Jonas et al., 2014; Randles et al., 2015) .
Field-Based Approaches to Meaning Violation and Recovery
A different approach to understanding how people respond to meaning threats and restoration comes from field studies of individuals responding to highly stressful experiences (Folkman, 2011) . These studies are largely based on transactional stress and coping theory, which emphasizes the central role of the specific meanings that individuals assign to the event in adjusting to the meaning threats posed by stressful life events. These specific meanings are termed cognitive appraisals (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) . Cognitive appraisals involve evaluating harm, threat, and challenge; making judgments about whether internal or external demands exceed one's resources; and determining whether one has the ability to respond effectively. Distress arises when these evaluations indicate harm or threat and a lack of adequate resources, initiating coping (Lazarus, 1993; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) . Hundreds of studies based on transactional stress and coping theory have documented the centrality of cognitive appraisals in driving coping processes in diverse populations facing major threats to meaning, including those facing serious illnesses like cancer and heart disease as well as bereavement, terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and many other major life stressors as well as chronic stressors and more quotidian hassles (see Aldwin, 2007 Aldwin, , 2011 .
Per transactional stress and coping theory, coping refers to efforts to deal with the event and the negative emotions it generates (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) . Coping is considered an effortful process that can take many forms, including implementing problem-focused strategies to directly alleviate stressors, emotionfocused strategies to manage distressing emotions evoked by stressors, and meaning-focused strategies to directly change one's appraisals of the situation (Folkman & Moskowitz, 2004) . Problem-focused coping has often been considered the most effective way to cope, but meaning-focused coping has been shown to be particularly common and helpful in dealing with stressors that are not amenable to direct solutions, such as loss or permanent damage (Aldwin, 2007; Park, Folkman, & Bostrom, 2001) . and findings from the lab and field.
1 Developed to explain how people deal with threats to their meaning systems, this model has been used to account for meaning-related phenomena in the context of high-magnitude stressors as well as lab-based meaningrelated findings (Park, 2010; Park & Folkman, 1997) . The meaning-making model centers on the notion that a discrepancy underlies the process of restoring meaning following violations. That is, when a situation is experienced as discrepant with global meaning, it is experienced as distressing, and this distress then drives efforts to alleviate that discrepancy.
The model (see Figure 1 ) includes global meaning (global beliefs and goals and the subjective sense of meaning) and its interaction with specific events in individuals' lives, termed situational meaning. Situational meaning encompasses many meaningrelated aspects, including (a) the meanings assigned to events, (b) the potential discrepancies between global and appraised meaning, (c) distress created by the discrepancies, (d) meaning making processes involved in reconciling those discrepancies, and (e) changes resulting from these reconciliation processes (meanings made).
People make meaning following a threat in many different ways, searching for some more favorable or consistent understanding of the event and its implications for their beliefs about themselves and their lives (assimilation). Meaning making may also entail reconsidering global beliefs and revising goals (accommodation; see Wrosch, Scheier, & Miller, 2013) and questioning or revising their sense of meaning in life (Steger, 2009; see Park, 2010 , for a review). Although this meaning-making model has been discussed primarily in the context of major stress and trauma, it is general enough to accommodate theories and findings from more basic, theory-driven lab-based work on threat compensation and therefore can be useful in bringing together these two distinct approaches to meaning violation and restoration following threat.
Individuals may encounter many different types and degrees of discrepancies between global meaning and situational meaning. According to this model, any violation of a global belief or goal would generate distress and initiate processes of restoration. Thus, a perceived violation of beliefs (e.g., of the world as fair, of oneself as patient, of events as being meted out justly) or goals (e.g., of things going as planned, of achieving desired daily or long-term objectives) constitutes violation of global meaning and would be expected to impact a subjective sense of meaning in life. However, whether to conceptualize any and all violations as existential meaning threats may be a matter of scholarly preference on where to place "meaning" boundaries. For example, some meaning researchers have shown that exposure to stimuli as seemingly innocuous as pictures of trees presented out of seasonal order reduces participants' subjective sense of life meaning (Heintzelman et al., 2013) . Such findings suggest that perhaps any belief or goal violation could impact existential meaning, produce meaning restoration efforts, or both. On the other hand, some meaning research focuses on threats to aspects of global meaning that are highly relevant to the very existence of the self (e.g., one's own mortality or identity; Pyszczynski et al., 2015) . Similarly, meaning restoration can focus explicitly on changing the meaning of a stressor (e.g., "actually, in some ways, it is better that I hadn't been selected") or can be more broadly conceptualized as any response to meaning threat (e.g., changing the TV channel to avoid an upsetting video). Thus, according to the meaning-making model, all coping is in response to meaning threats, but not all coping focuses on changing meaning. Because the concepts relevant to "meaning" are so broad, we here endeavor to hew closely to those meaning threats and restoration efforts that are more clearly existential in nature, but acknowledge this work is a subset of that conducted within the larger frame of global beliefs and goals.
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In the following section, we examine how lab-and field-based theory and research answer four major questions and use this model to illustrate where they converge or diverge. After reviewing how lab-based and field-based theories and research converge or diverge in their answers to each question, we suggest some ways that these two approaches can inform one another to advance our knowledge of meaning.
Lab and Field Approaches to Meaning Threat and Restoration

How Is Meaning Defined and Measured in the Context of Violation and Restoration?
In lab-based research on meaning threat, meaning is often only vaguely conceptually defined but appears to correspond to the global component of meaning depicted in Figure 1 . For example, the TMT tradition considers meaning to be related to having faith in one's cultural worldview (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999) while MMM has defined meaning as "expected relationships" (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012, p. 317) . More recently, a group of meaning threat researchers put forth a definition of meaning more consistent with that of the meaning making model: "coherence between beliefs, salient goals, and perceptions of the environment that provides a foundation for our interactions with the world" (Tullett et al., 2013, p. 402) . Operationally, lab-based research has sometimes measured meaning as subjective evaluations of life's meaningfulness (e.g., Heintzelman et al., 2013) , but more commonly, even lab-based studies that explicitly target meaning do not assess it but rather assume that meaning is threatened and is responsible for the observed experimental responses (e.g., .
Most lab studies of meaning threat center on one component of meaning, a sense of comprehension. The MMM suggests that meaning frameworks provide a sense of understanding and familiarity, and in the wake of expectancy violations, a sense of "unfamiliarity" is evoked (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012, p. 320) . Recently, Heintzelman and King (2014) gave more focused attention to a subjective sense of comprehension, arguing that stimuli character-1 We elected to use the meaning-making model to organize our discussion rather than the similarly named meaning-maintenance model (MMM; because the meaning-making model is more comprehensive, explicitly including not only the elements in the MMM but also others, such as appraisals and meaning made. The meaning-making model, predating the MMM by 9 years (Park & Folkman, 1997) , was based on a comprehensive review of meaning-related literature drawn primarily from field work, while the MMM has tended to focus primarily on lab-based work. The meaning-making model describes both relatively automatic and relatively effortful attempts to restore meaning, while the MMM focuses on the portion of meaning maintenance that occurs fluidly. Both models provide useful guides in study development and interpretation.
2 Others have struggled with these boundary issues (see Jonas et al., 2014; Randles et al., 2015) . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
ized by reliable patterns and coherence evoke a feeling that one's experiences "make sense" (p. 154), which can be measured using self-report items regarding meaning in life. Lab-based studies have demonstrated, for example, that when participants are shown pictures having an underlying pattern or linguistic triads that were coherent, their subjective sense of meaning (i.e., reports on items such as "my existence is very purposeful and meaningful") increased (Heintzelman et al., 2013) . Another line of lab-based work on meaning and meaning threats derives from the theoretical approach of RAM. From this labbased perspective, life is experienced as meaningful when one feels engaged in moving toward goals that remain unobstructed. A subjective sense of meaning in life is more reliably experienced when individuals are engaged in pursuing ultimate goals (e.g., religious aspirations) that cannot ever be fully attained but are also "beyond frustration" (McGregor, Prentice, & Nash, 2012) . In this line of research, subjective sense of meaning in life is rarely directly assessed.
Field studies of meaning in the context of coping with highly stressful events have primarily conceptualized meaning as a subjective sense of meaning in life, defined as having a sense of life as comprehensible and possessing a strong sense of purpose and mattering (e.g., Boyraz et al., 2012) , depicted as subjective sense of meaning (upper far-right in Figure 1 ). However, field-based research on meaning threats also conceptualizes meaning on the situational level (see lower portion of Figure 1 ), including appraisals of how stressful, threatening, central, or controllable the stressor is (lower far left in Figure 1) . Correspondingly, field studies of stressors such as cancer diagnosis/treatment and bereavement often focus on global subjective meaning using standard measures such as the Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Steger et al., 2006;  e.g., Boyraz et al., 2015) but also assess appraised meaning pertaining to participants' understanding of the specific situation, such as its stressfulness (Boyraz et al., 2012) or its centrality to oneself (e.g., Bellet et al., 2016) .
Field studies examining associations between a subjective sense of meaning in life and general well-being among individuals dealing with major stressors is common (e.g., van Tongeren et al., 2017) . However, only a handful of studies have directly examined how meaning threats and meaning restoration efforts relate to the subjective sense. These few existing studies have shown that the subjective sense of meaning in life is negatively associated with stressor severity and perceived violation of beliefs and goals by the stressor (Steger, Owens, & Park, 2015) and positively associated with better ability to make sense of the stressor and integrate it into one's global beliefs (Lancaster & Carlson, 2015) .
Both lab and field studies of meaning threat and restoration tend to make many assumptions about the nature of meaning. Although both typically conceptualize meaning in life as a subjective sense of comprehension, purpose, and mattering, lab-based studies rarely assess this subjective sense of meaning and instead infer a subjective sense of meaning is being threatened in the experiment (cf. Heintzelman & King, 2014) . Similarly, field studies of highmeaning threat, such as bereavement, violence, or high-mortality illness, typically do not explicitly assess most (or any) of the elements of global or situational meaning. Instead, meaning constructs are often inferred rather than directly measured, leaving unanswered the question of whether meaning in life and efforts to restore it are, in fact, the underlying driver of the observed behavior. Although theoretically consistent with views of meaning violation and restoration, more directly measuring aspects of meaning, particularly in lab-based studies, would yield information on how meaning is involved in the processes under study.
As noted, most lab research on violating meaning privileges the comprehension aspect of meaning in life. To the extent that coherence gives rise to a subjective sense of comprehension and a broader sense of meaning, individuals would be rattled by threats to that coherence and engage in efforts to restore meaning. However, the sense that one is unimpeded in pursuing worthwhile goals and that one matters in the cosmic scheme of the universe are also important subjective components of meaning in life that may (or may not) be amenable to simple acts of violation in lab-based situations but that are clearly involved in the kinds of highmagnitude stressors studied in the field (e.g., Dezutter, Dewitte, This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Thauvoye, & Vanhooren, 2017; Kraaij et al., 2008) . Lab-based studies in the RAM and, to a less-direct extent, TMT traditions have attempted to induce threat to important goals or one's goal for immortality, respectively, but typically do not assess subjective sense of meaningfulness. Lab-based studies might profitably be more specific regarding which aspects of meaning are targeted by specific experimental violations and determine the extent to which people may respond differently to threats to these different aspects of meaning. When they do measure meaning, both lab-and field-based studies tend to use measures of subjective sense of meaning that do not specifically focus on the construct of comprehensibility but rather assess the broad subjective sense of life as meaningful (George & Park, 2016b) . These measures do not differentiate between specific dimensions of that subjective sense of meaningcomprehension, purpose, and mattering-each of which may produce differential effects (George & Park, 2016a; Martela & Steger, 2016) .
What Are Meaning Threats?
Both lab-and field-based studies of meaning threat tend to adopt some variant of the notion that threats arise when people experience discrepancies between what they perceive or appraise has happened and what they expected to happen (beliefs) or wanted to happen (goals). These threats then motivate people to alleviate the discrepancy (see discrepancy component of Figure 1 ). But how do these two approaches characterize these threats?
Based on this general concept of threat as discrepancy, labbased studies typically rely on stimuli that obviously violate usual order (e.g., black diamond playing cards) or attempt to violate one's presumed specific goals (e.g., contemplating one's death). Lab-based studies of threat compensation tend to assume that the effects of the stimulus used in the experimental task produces a violation based on obvious logic (e.g., seasonal order of trees) or on the effect produced, rather than by directly assessing perceived violation (Randles et al., 2015) . Furthermore, much of the labbased threat compensation literature presumes that discrepancy does not need to be consciously experienced (e.g., Heintzelman et al., 2013; Proulx & Heine, 2008) . Indeed, a great deal of lab-based work has demonstrated that even without conscious awareness, as assessed via manipulation checks, meanings can apparently be violated through stimuli such as trees presented out of seasonal order or nonsense word pairings or abstract art (e.g., Heintzelman et al., 2013; Van Tongeren & Green, 2010) . Importantly, lab-based studies of meaning violation have demonstrated responses at the neurological level that correspond to these stimuli-induced threat responses, adding credibility to labbased conceptualizations of threat (Jonas et al., 2014) . In particular, brain areas including the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are activated by motivational or expectational discrepancies, such as errors, goal conflicts, and surprises. The ACC, in conjunction with other brain areas, monitors and manages conflicts and discrepancies (Tullett et al., 2013) .
In contrast to lab-based research, many field-based studies have highlighted perceptions of the threat, focusing on how specific appraisals (e.g., threat, harm, loss, ability to successfully cope) are key determinants of how individuals respond, including whether they feel threatened at all (Aldwin, 2007) . Transactional stress and coping theory posits that individuals' appraisals of experiences as discrepant with their beliefs and goals will generate stress and initiate efforts to resolve the discrepancy. Thus, individuals facing threats to meaning, minor and major alike, are thought to generate cognitions regarding the specific appraisal of the situation and the extent to which they are discrepant with global meaning (Aldwin, 2007; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) .
Indeed, myriad field studies have demonstrated that individuals vary widely in their internal experience of meaning violation to an objectively similar situation (Aldwin, 2011) . For example, a sample of cancer survivors showed wide variation in their appraisals of perceived threat of cancer recurrence (i.e., appraisals of the likelihood of cancer returning and its severity, if it did), some making no appraisals of threat and others making very high appraisals of threat. Furthermore, these threat appraisals may have significant consequences: In this study, threat appraisals substantially predicted survivors' fear of cancer recurrence (McGinty, Goldenberg, & Jacobsen, 2012) . Thus, many field studies of people dealing with stressful experiences have demonstrated the importance of attending to individuals' cognitions, specifically the appraised meanings that people assign to the stressor and the changes in these appraisals over time as people adjust to stressful situations. In essence, these assigned meanings determine the extent to which global meaning is violated (see Figure 1) .
Field studies of people facing many types of major stressors have demonstrated that threat and other types of appraisals drive individuals' efforts to deal with stressors. For example, one study of patients undergoing prostate cancer treatment assessed the extent to which the men appraised their cancer as threatening their masculine identity (a central aspect of their beliefs about selfidentity) with a Threat Appraisal Scale consisting of items such as "Having cancer makes me feel like less of a man." Controlling for appropriate covariates, threat appraisals predicted subsequent decreased emotional processing coping, which predicted subsequent declines in urinary, bowel, and sexual functioning across a 6-month period (Hoyt, Stanton, Irwin, & Thomas, 2013) . When assessing threat appraisals, researchers sometimes ask about specific threats such as recurrence severity, as noted above, but more often simply ask about threat more generally, with items such as how much the event is a "threatening situation" or how likely the event will "have a negative impact on me" (Peacock & Wong, 1990; see Park & George, 2013 , for more information on measurement approaches to threat in field-based studies).
Most field-based studies begin with the identification of an objective stressor, so conscious awareness of the stressor is a given. Furthermore, evidence from qualitative studies of people in stressful situations suggests that people are quite aware of violations to their meaning (e.g., statements like "This is not what I want"; "I didn't think this could happen"; "I don't understand why this happened to me"; Lam & Fielding, 2003; Newman, Riggs, & Roth, 1997) . However, awareness of discrepancy is rarely explicitly assessed in field studies either. A new measure, the Global Meaning Violation Scale, was designed to assess appraised violations of global beliefs and goals (Park et al., 2016) . Research using this measure has demonstrated that people report high levels of violations of both beliefs and goals in appraising experiences like cancer (Exline, Park, Smyth, & Carey, 2011) and combat (Steger et al., 2015) . Aside from qualitative data and studies with this new measure, however, there is as yet little evidence from field-based This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
research regarding the extent to which violations are explicitly and consciously experienced. Thus, both lab-and field-based research might profit from more explicit assessment of perceived violations and in understanding the individual differences in these perceived violations.
Researchers have not yet demonstrated whether or to what extent the consequences of subtle meaning violations used in lab studies are comparable to high-magnitude stressors. Importantly, discrepancy-inducing stimuli comprise not only temporaneous or trivial laboratory manipulations and high-magnitude traumatic events, but also a vast range in between these two extremes, including hassles, chronic stressors, and minor and major problems in many life domains.
3 Thus, awareness of discrepancies that drive efforts to reduce them may range from complete oblivion (e.g., the Proulx & Heine, 2008 , study in which the experimenter was surreptitiously switched in the middle of the experiment, with most participants not reporting having noticed) to constant awareness (e.g., ruminations about a trauma; Michael, Halligan, Clark, & Ehlers, 2007) . Furthermore, awareness of discrepancies might be implicit but have the potential to become explicit given proper cues, such as suggestion by a friend or therapist. Awareness of discrepancies is likely to be a more important consideration for people dealing with serious stressful situations in that being or becoming aware of discrepancies may underlie psychological symptoms and also allow individuals to engage in therapeutic processes to work through them (Sripada, Rauch, & Liberzon, 2016) .
Cognitions may be (relatively) unimportant in situations involving very basic stimuli that threaten coherence, when relatively minor responses can adequately alleviate the aversive arousal. However, with more significant threats to people's meaning systems, cognitions regarding what the event means and how it fits with their existing beliefs and goals are inevitably elicited and play an important part in the meaning threat recovery process. The vast individual differences in stressors' meaning regarding what is actually discrepant and distressing indicate the necessity of considering these aspects in research involving any kind of substantial meaning threat. This lack of attention to cognitions in lab-based studies and its key role in coping with serious meaning threats is a significant point of divergence between lab-and field-based approaches. It is possible that the same meaning threat detection process is at play with both minor lab-based threats and major threats such as those in field studies. However, with major threats, the meaning threat detection process may continue to be activated, generating distress until the cognitions regarding threat (i.e., appraisals) are brought in line with individuals' global meaning systems, a process described in the next section.
Lab-based research might profitably incorporate some selfreport measures of meaning-related constructs and, importantly, attend to both the specific aspect of meaning being threatened as well as individual differences in actual threat experienced by the same ostensible threat, while field-based research might incorporate experimental approaches. Although field research cannot randomize individuals to conditions of highly stressful events, experimental paradigms could be incorporated into field studies (e.g., experimental studies within samples of people dealing with a specific life stressor to determine how reminders of the stressor may threaten meaning within a lab setting, analog studies of meaning threat using videos of traumatic events; e.g., LassHennemann et al., 2014) . Such studies could advance our understanding of the biological substrate of people experiencing ongoing high-magnitude threats by examining physiological markers of threat (Townsend, Eliezer, & Major, 2013) . Some ongoing fieldbased research may allow investigators to capitalize on chance to prospectively study highly stressful events and potential meaning violation (e.g., Randles, Heine, Poulin, & Silver, 2017) .
In summary, although they use different methods and terminology, both lab-and field-based work suggests that an expectancy or motivational violation triggers compensatory or coping behavior, and both are premised on the notion that these underlying processes are central aspects of human functioning. This commonality supports the notion that meaning threat phenomena studied in lab and field settings are qualitatively similar, differing in degree rather than in substance, yet much more work is required to determine the extent to which these processes overlap.
How Do People Respond to Meaning Threats?
Lab-and field-based studies of meaning threats produce somewhat divergent pictures of responses to meaning threats, including whether meaning threats produce distress and the ways that people respond to those meaning threats. Many lab-based approaches to meaning violation have demonstrated that distress is often not observed following manipulations that create compensatory behaviors. For example, TMT has long purported that even when considering one's own death, participants do not report increased negative affect (see Lambert et al., 2014 , for a review). Similarly, when people are presented with stimuli such as pictures of trees out of seasonal order, they report lower levels of meaning in life, but not increases in negative affect (e.g., Heintzelman et al., 2013) .
However, other lab-based approaches assert that a sense of discomfort or aversive arousal does arise whenever people experience violations of meaning. Proulx and his colleagues, tonguein-cheek, named this feeling disanxiousuncertlibrium, to denote the vague sense of distress-anxiety, uncertainty, and disequilibrium-that lab tasks may produce. Some experimental studies indicate that meaning violations activate approach motivated states, presumably in order to mute the aversive arousal stimulated by the threat (McGregor et al., 2010) .
Researchers within the experimental threat compensation tradition have recently scrutinized the evidence that no negative affect arises following threats to comprehension, certainty, or existence. Some have questioned whether a lack of awareness of negative affect necessarily means none has been experienced, noting that subjective experience, physiological arousal, and behavioral expression are often not strongly correlated (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012; Randles et al., 2015; Tritt et al., 2012) . Methodological issues have also been raised regarding assessment of affect in these studies, suggesting that the most commonly used measure, the Positive and 3 Although it may be true that there is no greater threat than the knowledge of one's mortality, we would argue that reminders like those used in lab studies (e.g., mortality salience; Pyszczynski et al., 2015) , while indeed tapping into one's concerns regarding death, primarily function as analogs to actually facing one's demise and have a rather different impact than actually being given a terminal diagnosis and short life expectancy by a physician. Similarly, speculating about the eventual death of a loved one has a different impact than standing next to that loved one's coffin and living life without that person's presence. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Negative Affect Schedule, may be "the wrong tool for the job" (Randles et al., 2015, p. 707; see Jonas et al., 2014) . More recent work exploring alternative approaches to assessing affect has demonstrated that following meaning violations such as considering one's own death, people consistently experience increases in anxiety (Lambert et al., 2014) . For example, following a standard TMT protocol, participants in the mortality salience condition demonstrated increased death anxiety, but only after a delay (Abeyta, Juhl, & Routledge, 2014) . Lab-based and field-based studies diverge somewhat on the specific recovery responses in which people engage, as well as the ease of those responses, once meaning has been perceived to be threatened. Lab-based studies have produced strong evidence that, on average, people reliably engage in processes of meaning restoration following encounters with discrepancies. These processes have been termed "The Five As": assimilation (of experience so that it matches one's existing schemata), accommodation (of one's schemata so that they match experience), affirmation (of one's commitment to an-often wholly unrelated-meaning framework), abstraction (of meaningful percepts out of ambiguous stimuli), and assembly (of a whole new meaning framework; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012) . For example, when people are exposed to threats to their sense of permanence, control or certainty, given the option, they will typically affirm their commitment to unrelated beliefs, such as cultural identification or conservatism (Randles et al., 2015) .
Most lab-based studies have concluded that people engage in these meaning maintenance or restoration processes automatically and effortlessly, sometimes referred to as "fluid compensation." Fluid compensation involves bolstering alternative meaning frameworks when one's meaning is threatened (Van Tongeren & Green, 2010) ; according to this perspective, meaning frameworks are radically substitutable with one another in meaning maintenance efforts (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012 ). Many lab-based studies on fluid compensation have demonstrated fluid compensation effects. For example, participants exposed to a surreptitious switch of experimenter became more punitive toward a hypothetical case of someone arrested for prostitution, presumably restoring their sense of meaning by affirming their cultural worldview (Proulx & Heine, 2008) . Similar findings for affirmation of a cultural value have been demonstrated following many types of meaning-threatening stimuli, including mortality salience reminders, an absurd joke, or nonsense word pairings (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012) .
Most lab-based studies of threat compensation examine some type of simple affirmation (e.g., expressing more belief in God: Randles et al., 2015; expressing prejudice: Greenaway, Louis, Hornsey, & Jones, 2014;  or endorsing paranormal abilities: Greenaway, Louis, & Hornsey, 2013) , while some examine abstraction (e.g., striving to perceive patterns; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008) . Although the other three As are often mentioned in theoretical accounts of threat compensation (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012) , little lab-based threat-compensation work has examined assimilation (changing the meaning of the threat), accommodation (changing one's global beliefs or goals), or assembly (creating a new global meaning), except for studies of attitude change, along the lines of the original attitude dissonance research (Randles et al., 2015) . This lack is surprising, given that these latter three As form the core of meaning making in the context of major stressors (Park, 2010) .
In field studies of meaning violation, distress is typically reported as being fairly high and is seen as underlying the motivation to act, with the goal being to alleviate the discrepancy in order to alleviate the distress. For example, a study of students who lost a close friend, significant other, or professor/teacher in the Virginia Tech mass shooting found that posttraumatic stress (PTS) symptom severity 3 to 4 months after the shootings was quite high. Furthermore, PTS severity predicted grief severity a year later, an effect partially mediated through disrupted worldview beliefs (e.g., that the shooting made them feel less spiritual or less in control of their lives; Smith, Abeyta, Hughes, & Jones, 2015) .
Under conditions of high stress or trauma, people often engage in protracted recovery efforts rather than in an easy or fluid compensation process (i.e., easefully substitute one source of meaning with another in a compensatory manner without actually restoring harmony among global and situational meaning), as suggested by lab-based research. The magnitude of the discrepancy appears to determine the extent to which people effortfully attempt to restore their meaning in that the more violation experienced, the more effort expended to cope with the stressor (Park et al., 2016 ). An extensive literature on coping reports that people typically report engaging in many different types of coping over a period of time that can last years or even decades (see Aldwin, 2011 , for a review).
Field studies tend to focus on effortful coping as assessed by coping inventories in which people report the extent to which they have used strategies such as problem solving, positive reframing, acceptance, or seeking social support (see Aldwin, 2007) . Violations of global meaning (beliefs or goals) are thought to generate all coping efforts (Park & Folkman, 1997) , but not all coping efforts are aimed at changing situational or global meaning. Some coping strategies, such as positive reframing (attempting to see the stressor in a more positive light) explicitly constitute meaning making, but many other types of coping also involve efforts to alleviate discrepancies between one's global beliefs and goals and the meaning assigned to their stressful experience (e.g., by directly solving the problem). Copious evidence suggests that for those stressors most difficult to problem-solve, such as major illness or loss, meaning-making coping is very common (for a review, see Park, 2010) . The types of meaning-making coping identified in field studies are broad and include reappraising the stressor in more benign ways, making causal attributions or reattributions, seeking more information about the stressor, discussing one's situation with other people, making downward comparisons, relying on one's religious beliefs and connections with a higher power, searching for and identifying benefits from the situation, and changing one's global beliefs and goals (Park, 2010) . Thus, these coping strategies map well onto the assimilation, accommodation, and perhaps the assembly aspects of the five As identified by Proulx and Inzlicht (2012; see Figure 1 , far lower right).
One major difference between lab-and field-based research is the role of individual differences. Field-based studies tend to highlight individual variations in responses following discrepancies. Unlike lab-based studies that use experimental methods to provide direct comparisons between conditions, field-based studies, relying primarily on observational data, typically examine the degree of perceived threat and other appraisals of the situation among individuals within a group all facing a similar objective threat, such as the possibility of cancer recurring (McGinty et al., This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
2012) and then examine how these differences in appraisals predict meaning-making coping responses. Importantly, these field-based studies highlight how different individuals respond to meaning threat, a phenomenon that could profitably be examined in labbased studies.
Another divergence between lab-and field-based studies is the role of distress. The lack of distress noted in lab-based research following violations does not map well on to instances of meaning violations that arise following stressful experiences as studied in field research. Another important difference between lab-and field-based studies of meaning violation is in the types of distress on which they focus. In lab-based perspectives, the focus is much narrower and usually confined to some variant of anxiety. In field studies however, violations of meaning have been shown to produce a range of negative emotional responses, including helplessness, panic, anger, depression, grief, or PTS symptoms, which include intrusions, avoidance, and hyperarousal as well as anxiety (Briere & Scott, 2014; Martin & Dahlen, 2005) . It is possible that these other forms of distress are more relevant to goal violation than to violations of coherence. Lab studies that compare different types of meaning threats would be better positioned to address this issue. More generally, researchers conducting lab-based studies of meaning violation might consider alternative ways to assess distress (see Randles et al., 2015) . Lab-based studies comparing different types of meaning threats may also determine whether some types of threats (e.g., those most central to the self) produce more distress or anxiety than do others.
The types of meaning-restorative or meaning-making coping efforts studied in lab-and field-based settings are also quite different. Many of the most common types of meaning-making coping efforts have rarely or never been examined, even in analog form, in lab-based studies of threats to meaning. Furthermore, in lab-based studies, people are typically given only one option for maintaining or making meaning (e.g., affirmation of political opinions or religious beliefs), so although people may show varying degrees of reliance on that single strategy, these studies do not allow for examining why people engage in a particular strategy over another. However, as noted above, in dealing with stressful situations, people have a variety of means to turn to in their efforts to maintain or restore meaning, and different people will choose different options. Field studies are far more likely to study multiple types of meaning-making responses in the face of meaning threats and their differential effects on adjustment. For example, a study of recent amputees found that they used multiple types of meaning making (positive cognitive restructuring, resolution, acceptance, negative cognitive processing, and self-comparisons), and these meaning-making efforts differentially predicted their well-being at the end of their first year (Phelps et al., 2008) . Future lab-based studies of meaning threat might consider simultaneously including multiple options for meaning restoration to examine the ways that different individuals may restore their meaning, allowing examination of individual differences in the ways that different individuals respond to meaning threats.
Field studies of people dealing with major stressors yield little evidence that people engage in the type of easy and fluid compensation demonstrated in experimental studies of threat compensation (mostly affirmation), perhaps because most coping inventories do not ask about these types of processes. However, several studies demonstrated that following the September 11 terrorist attacks, Americans temporarily became more religious (Uecker, 2008) and patriotic (DeRoma, Saylor, Swickert, Sinisi, Marable, & Vickery, 2003) , and a recent prospective study demonstrated that after experiencing major life stressors, individuals demonstrated shifts toward more conservative and more polarized views on issues such as immigration (Randles et al., 2017) . Thus, field studies might include measures of meaning making coping that include affirmation as well as abstraction and assembly.
In general, however, field research has demonstrated that dealing with high-level threats to meaning is arduous work rather than easy or fluid. There is scant evidence that in dealing with major stressors, strategies such as affirming worldviews or shifting political attitudes are common or aid in recovery following massive meaning violation. More prospective work could build on the recent study of shifting attitudes (Randles et al., 2017) to study affirmation processes, as could analog studies or experimental studies within the field setting to shed light on microprocesses that may be occurring within meaning recovery following major stressors that occurs in a longer timeframe.
Why Does Meaning Restoration Matter?
As Figure 1 illustrates, specific changes or products result (i.e., meanings made) from meaning-making processes. The products of responses to meaning threats can take the form of changes in one's view of the problem (the result of processes such as assimilation or reappraisal) or one's global meaning system (the product of accommodation or assembly). Either of these changes can alleviate discrepancy by creating harmony between one's perceived experience and one's expectancies and desires (Park et al., 2017) . Restoration of harmony between global and situational meaning is related to a host of well-being indices (Bellet et al., 2016; Williams, Davis, & Millsap, 2002) .
Few lab-based studies distinguish between the process and product of meaning making, but both are inherent in their findings. For example, following exposure to a dissonance induction regarding writing about how interesting a text passage was, people reported higher beliefs in God (Randles et al., 2015) . This finding includes both a process (the shifting of belief) and the product (a higher degree of belief).
In terms of understanding the implications of either palliative or compensatory behavior on participants' psychological well-being or adjustment, lab-based research on meaning threats has appeared mostly uninterested. Rather, these studies typically aim to understand the processes of responding to threat. Clearly, however, the underlying premise of these perspectives is that successfully managing meaning threats is important to healthy psychological functioning (e.g., Maxfield, John, & Pyszczynski, 2014) .
In contrast, most field-based studies of meaning restoration following meaning violations are keenly interested in how those processes predict participants' subsequent functioning. Studies usually include outcomes such as well-being, symptomatology, or quality of life and examine the extent to which meaning making efforts predict these outcomes. For example, a recent study of parents of children with autism examined coping strategies as mediators and moderators of their quality of life (Dardas & Ahmad, 2015) .
Furthermore, distinctions between processes and products of meaning restoration are commonly drawn in field-based studies This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. (Park, 2010) , and many products of meaning making following violation have been documented. For example, studies of coping with highly stressful events have demonstrated changes in global meaning, such as in beliefs in control, identity, and God, and in life goals (Frazier, Steward, & Mortensen, 2004; Park, 2005; Rini et al., 2004) as well as perceptions of positive benefits or growth from the situation (Park, 2005) . One especially important finding from field studies is that there are vast variations not only in the processes in which people engage in efforts to restore meaning and the products of those processes, but also in the extent to which people are ever able to restore meaning. Field-based research has demonstrated that, following massive meaning violations, some people are resilient and suffer relatively little distress, some eventually recover, and some remain permanently damaged and unable to return to their pretrauma levels of functioning (Bonanno & Diminich, 2013) . Determinants of these trajectories are as yet not well understood.
The divergence in emphasis and focus between lab-based and field-based studies of meaning threat are largest in how they address the broader implications of meaning threats and restoration. Although both approaches are ultimately aimed at understanding and presumably improving the ways that people respond to meaning threats, lab-based approaches have rarely considered their clinical implications (with the exception of some TMT researchers; e.g., Maxfield, John, & Pyszczynski, 2014) .
Current literature suggests a large difference in the value that lab-and field-based studies assign to distinguishing between processes and products of meaning making. Distinguishing between processes and products is important in the context of serious life events, as each has important clinical implications: the processes may serve as intervention targets to facilitate recovery while the end results are relevant to people's identities, future functioning, and well-being (Park et al., 2017) . Although such distinctions could be drawn in lab-based studies, their focus to date has been on the processes of threat compensation rather than any changes induced by the process. Such changes would likely be short-lived, given the relatively small discrepancies involved in lab-based studies, but could serve as an additional variable of interest.
Furthermore, although lab-based studies do not typically focus on such questions as resilience trajectories, they could be designed to shed light on the extent to which individuals differ in their compensation following discrepancy manipulations.
Summary and Conclusions
Our comparison of lab-and field-based approaches to meaning threat and recovery aimed to determine whether these approaches converge on a common set of phenomena. On some issues, such as the conceptualization of the subjective experience of meaning that is involved in meaning violation, these approaches are fairly convergent. On other conceptual and operational issues, there is less evidence of convergence and even a good amount of divergence. Yet, for the most part, it is not clear whether these divergences are fundamental or merely methodological. Many divergences between lab-and field-based approaches appear to be due to the common focus and lack of attention to other aspects within each approach. Thus, our conclusions regarding the convergence of lab-based and field-based approaches are, at this point, quite preliminary, with stronger conclusions awaiting future research evaluating some of the points of apparent divergence.
While research that more deliberately addresses these apparent divergences is needed to determine whether lab-and field-based approaches are truly converging on the same set of phenomena, our hunch is that the many specific lab-based approaches to meaning threat have a great deal of overlap with field-based approaches, although they many not entirely overlap. For example, in response to high-magnitude stressors that grossly violate global meaning, individuals tend to use many other types of coping efforts in addition to those specifically focused on restoring meaning, such seeking social support and using behavioral or emotional disengagement (e.g., Aldwin, 2007) . These could broadly be seen as meaning related, given that people engage in them following meaning threats.
An important issue throughout a number of the propositions where lab-and field-based studies diverge is the degree to which people are aware of the threats to meaning that they encounter and of their efforts to respond. It is important to keep in mind that threats to meaning occur from the very basic perceptual level, beneath conscious awareness, to the most disturbing and substantial level of direct trauma exposure, and thus, there is a wide range of meaning threats. It may be that awareness of threat and of efforts to respond depend on the magnitude of the threat to meaning. The issues of consciousness of threat and responses to it are beyond the scope of this article but certainly are important issues for future examination vis-à-vis convergence of lab and field approaches.
Another important divergence is the degree to which people can "fluidly compensate." Lab studies have placed a heavy emphasis on fluidity, with the idea that, following threats, individuals may quite handily engage in restorative efforts in unrelated areas (e.g., via affirmation; Randles et al., 2015) . Field studies, on the other hand, have rarely focused on such compensation and have instead focused on restorative efforts aimed at the threat itself (e.g., assimilation or accommodation; Park, 2010) . This difference in focus may indicate an underlying difference in the relative effectiveness of fluid restorative efforts versus content-specific restorative efforts. When a threat is trivial (e.g., trees out of order), a merely palliative effort to relieve the negative arousal may suffice. However, when one's most cherished beliefs and goals are disrupted (e.g., trauma), merely relieving negative arousal may not be sufficient, and restorative efforts targeting the discrepancy itself may be necessary.
The role of cognitions, such as appraisals of the violation and its implications, is another point of divergence between lab-based and field-based approaches, although this divergence may be due more to different emphases than to actual differences in the phenomena studied by the two approaches. That is, cognitions may play a role in responding to meaning threats in proportion to their degree of violation of global beliefs and goals. The greater the violations, the greater the role that cognitions may play.
Another important area of apparent divergence between lab and field approaches is the import they give to variety and individual difference. As we noted, lab-based studies tend to focus on a very narrow set of meaning-restoration processes in any given study, while field-based studies tend to include a broad set. It is possible that as meaning threats increase in their magnitude and complexity, people respond in more complicated and differentiated ways. It is also posThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
sible that with basic and relatively trivial threats, any response is as good as another (thus, affirmation of in-group bias, religion, or social justice beliefs) but that as threats increase in their personal salience and significance, individual differences in use and effectiveness of different responses becomes more apparent. It would be useful to examine how the range of meaning-making strategies identified in field work plays out in laboratory settings. For example, when do participants engage in assimilation versus accommodation when confronted with an immediate meaning threat? Distinguishing processes and products of field-based research, along with the focus on implications of threat responses to psychological adjustment to the meaning threat, are hallmarks of field-based approaches. These are important aspects of responding to meaning threats that arise in real life. Yet lab-based approaches, focused more on understanding mechanisms than on implications, have not incorporated products as a focus. This appears to be a place where lab-based and field-based studies could greatly inform one another and advance the science of meaning-threat responses.
Lab-and field-based approaches tend to come at many of the issues we have reviewed from opposite ends, and meeting somewhere in the middle makes sense. Field-based concerns such as implications for psychological adjustment may be far from the purview of those researchers more interested in the intricacies of fluid responses to imperceptible threats, while those nuances are of relatively less importance for those seeking to understand the clinical relevance of major threats to meaning posed by traumas such as combat exposure or terrorist attacks. This meeting in the middle will likely lead to important advances in both approaches as well as in our general understanding of meaning violations and restoration.
